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- 1. Immediately after World War II the USSR began an intensive exploitation of the wartime German missile experience and that by 1948-1950 it had embarked on a guided missiles program of its own. We are unable to define with precision the present dimensions of this program; however, the large number of personalities and activities believed to be involved in the program leads us to the conclusion that it is an extensive one.
- 2. The USSR has the basic scientific and technical capabilities to support a comprehensive research and development program and an adequate economic base for a sizable production program, although we have no evidence to confirm or deny that any missile is currently in production. Our analysis indicates that the limitations of the Soviet electronics and precision mechanism industries are likely to create serious battlemecks in view of other competing demands.
- 3. For the foreseeable future it does now appear that either missile accuracy or missile reliability will approach those obtainable by unopposed aircraft delivery. Over the next several years the increasing size of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and the larger yields available from nuclear warheads will make missiles an increasingly effective means of nuclear weapons delivery, despite their limitations in reliability and accuracy. Nevertheless, we believe that the Soviets will place primary reliance on aircraft delivery of nuclear weapons so long as the Soviet stockpile remains

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limited and Allied air defenses can be penetrated without unacceptable losses. We recognize, however, that these considerations would not preclude earlier employment of nuclear missiles when the advantages of surprise or other factors so dictate.

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